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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
These actions were filed seeking mandamus 
and declaratory relief to,the effect that certain 
elected Salt Lake County officials should be penalized, 
including the forfeiture of wages and official bond, 
for failure to comply with their statutory duties 
regarding the preparation and the delivery of the tax 
assessment book of Salt Lake County property for the 
years 1978 and 1979. 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants commenced the first 
action in 1978 and the second action in 1979. The 
actions involve identical questions of law and name 
as Defendants the holders of the same elected Salt Lake 
County corporate officers and officials. The question 
of law is the imposition of penalties against the 
elected Salt Lake County Assessor, Clifford Cockayne 
for the year 1978, and Milton Yorgenson for the year 
1979, for their failure to comply with statutory 
deadlines regarding the preparation and delivery of 
the Salt Lake County Tax Assessment book. 
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In the interest of judicial economy and 
justice these two appeals were consolidated for 
the purpose of briefs and oral argument pursuant to 
Stipulation of the parties and an Order entered by 
this Court on March 17, 1980. 
II 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Mutual Motions for Surmnary Judgment 
concerning the year 1978 were heard on May 17, 1979. 
The same mutual Motions concerning the year 1979 
was heard on January 21, 1980. The Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah denied Plaintiffs-Appellants' Motion for Surmnary 
Judgment and granted the Defendants-Respondents' 
Motions for Sunnnary Judgment in both instances. Both 
Judgments were timely appealled by Plaintiffs-Appellants 
herein. 
III 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of_ 
the Judgments below and a determination that the statutory 
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penalites be invoked for Defendants' failure to comply 
with specific statutory deadlines. 
IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
These actions were filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County 
seeking a declaration of Defendants-Respondents' 
failure to comply with specific statutory duties and 
deadlines; a ruling that the Defendants-Respondents 
were subject to specific statutory penalties for this 
failure; and an order requiring county officials to 
enforce those penalties. 
The Defendants-Respondents admit that they 
failed to comply with statutory deadlines regarding 
the preparation and delivery of the tax assessment 
book for Salt Lake County property taxes for the years 
1978 and 1979. For the year 1978 the Defendants claim 
that they could not meet the statutory deadline of the 
first Monday in May because the Utah State Tax 
Commission failed to complete the re-appraisal of all 
of the property in Salt Lake County in a timely manner. 
For the year 1979 the Defendants claim that they failed 
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to meet the deadline "due to impossibility" of meeting 
the statutory deadlines. 
Mutual Motions for Summary Judgment were 
argued to the Court. For the year 1978 the Honorable 
Christine Durham found that the statutory deadline 
(U.C.A. §59-5-30, 1953) was "directory" in nature 
rather than mandatory, that the Defendants had 
substantially complied with the statutory requirements, 
that the Utah State Tax Commission had granted a 
"de facto" extension of time, and that the statutory 
provision requiring that no compensation be paid the 
Assessor "until said affidavit [of completion and 
delivery of the tax assessment book] is made and 
subscribed", meant that the wages were withheld not 
forfeited, and could be paid when the Assessor finally 
complied (in 1978, albeit four months late, with no 
withholding of wages during the default). For the year 
1979 the parties stipulated that the Honorable Bryant 
Croft could enter a Summary Judgment based upon, and in 
conformance with, th~ prior ruling of Judge Durham for 
the year 1978. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants have appealed from both 
rulings in this consolidated appeal. 
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v 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS * 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants are residents 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and own real 
property in the county. The Appellants are tax payers 
within Salt Lake County and were obligated to pay and 
did pay taxes for the years 1978 and 1979 upon real 
property in Salt Lake County. 
The Appellants brought this action for 
declaratory relief against certain elected Salt Lake 
County officials regarding the failure of said officials 
to comply with statutory deadlines regarding the 
preparation and delivery of the tax assessment book for 
Salt Lake County property taxes for the years 1978 and 
1979. 
The Defendants concede that they failed to 
comply with statutory deadlines. 
In responding to Requests for Admission and 
Interrogatories the Defendant Cockayne admits that he 
failed to complete his assessment book and deliver the 
same to the Salt Lake County Treasurer on or before the 
~~Footnote 
The Trial Record in Case No. 16790 is cited as T.R.I; 
The Trial Record in Case No. 16919 is cited as T.R.II. 
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first Monday in May, 1978, as required and set forth 
in U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953). (T.R.I p. 26 and p. 33) 
Said assessment book was delivered by the Defendant 
Cockayne to the Salt Lake County Treasurer on or about 
September 6, 1978. (T.R.I p. 31) 
In responding to Requests for Admission and 
Interrogatories the Defendant Yorgason admits that he 
failed to complete his assessment book and deliver the 
same to the Salt Lake County Treasurer on or before the 
first Monday in May, 1979, (May 7, 1979) as required and 
set forth in U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953). (T.R.II p.28 and p.32) 
Said assessment book was delivered by the Defendant 
Yorgason to the Salt Lake County Treasurer on or about 
July 30, 1979. (T.R.II p. 31 and p. 32). 
The excuse for the delay for the year 1978 
stated that the lateness was "totally the result of the 
untimely manner in which the State Tax CoIImlission of 
Utah conducted and implemented the reappraisal program 
of Salt Lake County". (T.R.I p. 31) There was a 
contract entered into by Salt Lake County and the Utah 
State Tax Commission in 1976 to reappraise all property 
in Salt Lake County with a tenative completion date of 
June 30, 1978. (T.R.I pp. 109-118) 
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The excuse for the delay for the year 1979 
stated that the lateness was "due to impossibility" 
(T.R.II p. 28) and "difficulties in trying to meet the 
statutory deadlines and the impossibility thereof". 
(T.R.II p. 29) 
The Respondents indicated in their answers 
to interrogatories that during the eight year period, 
1972 through 1979 inclusive, that the Assessment book 
had never been completed within the statutory deadline 
of the first Monday in May. (T.R.II p. 31) 
The Respondents commencing at approximately 
May 17, 1978 and continuing through May 14, 1979 had 
correspondence with the Utah State Tax Commission 
discussing the need and seeking permission to have 
hearings and meetings of the Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization after the statutory deadline of June 20, 
1978. T.R.I pp. 66-103) 
U.C.A. §59-5-33 (1953) provides that if an 
assessor fails to comply with the first Monday in May 
deadline as to completion of the assessment book that 
he shall forfeit $1,000. from his official bond. U.C.A. 
§59-5-30 (1953) provides that if an assessor fails to 
comply with the first Monday in May deadline as to 
completion of the assessment book that he shall not be 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
paid or draw any compensation for services until the 
book is completed. 
There are no specific statutory exceptions 
or excuses or variances provided for the penalties 
set forth in U.C.A. §59-5-33 or §59-5-30 (1953). 
The Respondents admit that the Defendant 
Cockayne continued to receive his salary from Salt Lake 
County for services performed as Salt Lake County 
Assessor from the first Monday in May, 1978, (May 1, 
1978) through September 6, 1978 when he finally completed 
the Assessment book (T.R. I p.26). There has been no 
forfeiture against the official bond of the Defendant 
Cockayne as set forth in U.C.A. §59-5-33 (1953). (T.R.I 
pp. 45-46) None of the Defendants have taken any action 
to seek forfeiture under the bond or to collect or re-
take the salary paid to the Defendant Cockayne for the 
period between May 1, 1978 and September 6, 1978. (T.R.I 
pp. 45-46). 
The Respondents admit that the Defendant 
Yorgason continued to receive his salary from Salt Lake 
County for services performed as Salt Lake County 
Assessor from the first Monday in May, 1979, (May 7, 1979) 
through July 30, 1979 when he finally completed the 
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the Assessment book (T.R.II p.29 and p. 33). There has 
been no forfeiture against the official bond of the 
Defendant Yorgason as set forth in U.C.A. §59-5-33 
(1953). (T.R.II p.34). None of the Defendants have 
taken any action to seek forfeiture under the bond or 
to collect or re-take the salary paid to the Defendant 
Yorgason for the period between May 7, 1979 and July 30, 
1979. (T.R.II p.29). 
The Appellants are not seeking any determination 
or ruling with regard to the validity of the property tax 
assessments made by the Respondents for the year 1978 or 
1979. 
VI 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY OFFICIALS ARE OBLIGATED 
TO COMPLY WITH STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES 
The applicable statute in the instant case 
is U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953) which provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
59-5-30. Assessor to complete assessment 
book and subscribe affidavit.--On or 
before the first Monday of May in each 
year the assessor must complete his 
assessment book and deliver the same to 
the County Treasurer. He must take and 
subscribe an affidavit in the assessment 
book to be substantially as follows: 
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I,---------, the assessor of ---------
County, do swear that before the first 
Monday in May, 19--, I made diligent 
inquiry and examination, and visited 
and inspected, either personally or by 
deputy, all of the property within the 
county subject to assessment by me; that 
the same has been assessed on the assessment 
book equally and uniformly according to 
the best of my judgment, information and 
belief, at thirty per cent of its reasonable 
fair cash value; that I have faithfully 
complied with all the duties imposed on 
the assessor under the revenue laws; and 
that I have not imposed any unjust or 
double assessments through malice or ill 
will or otherwise, or allowed anyone to 
escape a just and equal assessment through 
favor or reward, or otherwise. 
The assessor shall not be paid or draw any 
compensation for services after the first 
Monday in May of each year, until said 
affidavit is made and subscribed. A 
failure to make or subscribe such affidavit, 
or any affidavit, will not in any manner 
affect the validity of the assessment. 
[emphasis added] 
The Respondents Cockayne and Yorgason were the 
Salt Lake County Assessors at times pertinent to these 
actions and were charged with certain statutory duties 
as Assessor. The Respondents have failed to comply with 
the statutory duties imposed upon them by U.C.A. §59-5-30 
(1953), as amended; specifically, the respective assessment 
books were not completed and delivered to the Salt Lake 
County Treasurer as required on the first Monday in May 
in 1978 or in 1979. 
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There are no specific statutory exceptions 
or variances or excuses provided regarding the non-
compliance with U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953) by a County 
Assessor. 
Point II 
THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS OF §59-5-30 OF THE UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED CARRIES WITH IT SPECIFIC PENALTIES 
U.C.A. §59-5-33 (1953), as amended, provides 
in pertinent part as follows: 
59-5-33. Penalty for neglect to complete 
assessment book.--Every assessor who fails 
to complete and deliver his assessment 
book to the County Treasurer within the 
time prescribed by law, [U. C .A. 59-5-30 
(1953): the first Monday of May in each 
year] ... shall forfeit the sum of $1,000, 
to be recovered on his official bond, for 
the use of the county, or to be deducted 
from his salary by the Board of County 
Commissioners. 
U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953) as set forth above 
provides another penalty for the non-complying Assessor 
in that he "shall not be paid or draw any compensation 
for services after the first Monday in May of each year, 
until said affidavit [of completion and delivery of the 
assessment book] is made and subscribed." 
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There are no specific statutory exceptions 
or variances or excuses provided to avoid the penalties 
of U.C.A. §59-5-30 or §59-5-33 (1953), loss of salary and 
forfeiture from the official bond. 
The Respondents argued in the Court below and 
the Court found that the language of U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953)--
The assessor shall not be paid or draw any 
compensation for services after the first 
Monday in May of each year, until said 
affidavit [of completion and delivery of 
the assessment book] is made and subscribed. 
directed a "postponement" of payment of salary rather 
than:a "forfeiture" of salary. If the legislature had 
desired a postponement clear language to that effect 
could have been used. Instead the legislature choose to 
direct that the assessor shall not be paid or draw any 
compensation during the period of his non-compliance. 
This provision should be read in conjunction with the 
clear forfeiture language of U.C.A. §59-5-33 (1953); 
that statute does not say the forfeiture shall be 
I 
nullified and the money returned when the assessment 
book is completed. Logical construction of the two 
statutes must be to the effect that severe and strict 
penalties were to be extracted when there was non-
compliance by an assessor, forfeiture of salary and from 
the official bond. 
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Point III 
THE AGREEMENT TO REAPPRAISE PROPERTY IN SALT 
LAKE COUNTY DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE FAILURE TO 
MEET THE STATUTORY DEADLINE IN 1978 
The agreement between the Utah State Tax 
Commission and Salt Lake County to reappraise all the 
property in Salt Lake County and the delay in the 
completion of that contract does not justify the failure 
of the assessor to meet the statutory deadline in the 
completion of his assessment book for the year 1978. 
The contract was entered into on April 1, 1976. Time 
was not of the essence in the performance of the contract. 
By its own terms there was no specific deadline for the 
performance. The parties hoped that the work would be 
completed in time to include the reappraisals in the 1978 
calendar year assessment rolls, but there was no guarantee. 
Various provisions of the contract make it clear that 
there was no deadline: 
It is contemplated that the reappraisal program 
hereunder shall be completed in time for use 
and incorporation into the 1978 calendar year 
assessment rolls, levy and ta.~ collection; 
provided, however, that this time may be 
extended by the written mutual agreement of 
the parties; . . . (T. R. I, p. 111) 
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Further, that such reappraised properties 
shall not be incorporated into the assessment 
roll until all of the properties located in 
Salt Lake County ... have been completely 
reappraised. . . (T.R.I, p. 110) 
The County hereby agrees to incorporate in 
its calendar year 1978 assessment roll if ~the reappraisal program is] completed: or 
in such subsequent year as the reappraisal 
program is finally completed, ... the 
assessed valuations arrived at in the 
reappraisal program. (T.R.I, pp.115-116) 
The most telling provision of the contract is 
the time set for the final payment of money from the 
County to the State Tax Cormnission for their services. 
Appendix I to the contract contemplates that the final 
payment for services will be on or before June 30, 1978, 
but goes on to say 
In no event will the final payment due from 
the County to Cormnission under the reappraisal 
program be due or payable until the entire 
reappraisal program for Salt Lake County has 
been completed in full and incorporated into 
the tax rolls of Salt Lake County. (T.R.I, p.118) 
The deadline for the County Assessor to complete 
his assessment book was May 1, 1978 and the reappraisal 
contract had an anticipated completion date of June 30, 1978. 
Although the reappraisal contract appears to be 
a contract for services from the Utah State Tax Commission 
to be rendered for the County of Salt Lake, the contract 
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really is a mutual agreement spelling out the responsibilitie 
of the two entities in reappraising the property within 
Salt Lake County. (See U.C.A.§59-5-109 (2), 1953). The 
Utah State Tax Commission was to work closely with Salt 
Lake County officials to reappraise the property. The 
costs of the reappraisal was to be bourne 70% by the State 
Tax Commission and 30% by Salt Lake County. (T.R.I p.113). 
When the reappraisal was not completed by the 
May 1, 1978 deadline, the Salt Lake County Assessor should 
have completed his assessment book using the information 
available to him from the proceeding year. This was 
contemplated by the reappraisal contract and the law. 
The Respondents claim that in 1978 non-
compliance was not the result of their failure but was 
"totally the result of the untimely manner" in which the 
State Tax Commission conducted and implemented the 
reappraisal program for Salt Lake County. The Defendants 
allege that the Commission failed to live up to the terms 
of the agreement. Even if this were true, that contract 
does not supercede the statutory duty of the assessor to 
make his May l, 1978 deadline. That point was covered in 
the contract: 
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The parties to this Agreement recognize that 
each such party has certain constitutional 
and statutory powers and duties relating to 
the assessment of property and do hereby 
agree that nothing contained in this 
Agreement shall be construed as having 
limited, expanded, transferred, abrogated 
or relinquished any such powers or duties 
from or by one party to the other. (T.R.I p.115) 
The signing of the contract between Salt Lake 
County and the State Tax Commission in no way could alter 
the statutory obligations of the assessor. 
The fallacy of Respondents argument as to the 
cause of the delay in 1978 is shown by the Answers to 
Interrogatories by the Defendant Milton Yorgason regarding 
the failure to meet the deadline for the year 1979. He 
said "The assessment roll was not completed by the first 
Monday in May because it was physically impossible to do 
so". (T.R.II p. 31) He goes on to tell us: 
The record shows that the assessment rolls 
were completed on the dates as follows in 
previous years: 
1972 - July 28 
1973 - July 8 
1974 - July 13 
1975 - July 11 
1976 - August 2 
1977 - July 20 
1978 - August 29 
(T.R.II, p.31) 
Even if Salt Lake County had not been in the middle of a 
reappraisal program in 1978, the track record of the Salt 
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Lake County Assessors Office shows that it probably 
would not have completed the assessment book within 
the statutory deadline. 
Point IV 
THERE WAS NO EXTENSION GRANTED ALLOWING 
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR TO AVOID 
THE MAY 1, 1978 DEADLINE 
The Respondents claim and the Court below 
found that for the year 1978 the State Tax Commission 
had granted a de facto extension of the May 1, 1978 
deadline. (T.R.I p. 65) 
There is no specific statutory authority that 
would allow the State Tax Commission to grant such an 
extension. The State Tax Commission does have broad 
supervisory powers regarding taxation within the state 
(U.C.A. §59-5-46, 1953), however, no where is the 
Commission granted the power to repeal legislation. 
U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953) provides a specific deadline and 
was enacted by the legislature; the State Tax Commission 
is not granted the power to waive compliance with that 
statutory deadline or to repeal that law. U.C.A §59-5-46 
(2) and (3), (1953) prohibit the Tax Commission from 
adopting rules or regulations in conflict with state law. 
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There is no mention at all of any extension 
of the May 1, 1978 deadline in any of the evidence 
presented to the Court below. The Respondents asked 
for and received permission to hold Board of Equalization 
hearings after the statutory deadline of June 20, 1978. 
The State Tax Commission has specific power to grant such 
an extension (U.C.A. §59-5-46 (10), 1953) That permission 
was granted by the State Tax Commission. (T.R.I pp.66-103) 
Hearings by the Board of Equalization are a distinct 
stage in assessment and taxation of property which occurrs 
after the Assessor has completed and delivered his 
assessment book. Between May 17, 1978 and May 14, 1979 
there was a series of letters between the Salt Lake 
Auditor and the State Tax Commission regarding holding 
the Board of Equalization hearings after the statutory 
deadline. (T.R.I pp. 66-103) Those letters show that 
(1) there is a statutory procedure to have Board of 
Equalization hearings late, (2) the State Tax Commission 
has the power to allow Board of Equalization hearings 
to be held late, and (3) the Salt Lake County officials 
did not bother to correspond with the State Tax Commission 
about Board of Equalization hearings being late until 
May 17, 1978, more than two weeks after the Salt Lake 
County Assessor had missed his May 1, 1978 deadline. 
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If the State Tax Commission had the power to 
waive or extend the May 1, 1978 deadline, why did not 
the County and the Commission specifically do that in 
writing? 
There is no grant of power to the State Tax 
Commission in general or under the re-evaluation program 
(U.C.A. §59-5-46 and §59-5-109, 1953) allowing extensions 
of the statutory May deadline of the Salt Lake County 
Assessor. The terms of the contract between the County 
and the Tax Commission as discussed above provided for 
the distinct probability that the reappraisal work would 
not be done by May l, 1978. The terms of the contract 
clearly stated that the Tax Commission was not taking on 
or changing any of the statutory obligations of the 
county officials. (T.R.I p. 115) 
There was no evidence of an extension granted 
to the Salt Lake County Assessor for the year 1978 and 
the Utah State Tax Commission did not have the power to 
grant any such extension. The fact of the matter is, 
based on the record before the Court, there was no 
discussion or mention of any such extension by the County 
or the Tax Commission. 
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Point V 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT 
UNDER U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953) 
The Respondents allege that this Court has 
indicated that the time limitations set forth in taxing 
statutes are directory rather than mandatory and 
substantial compliance therewith is sufficient. They 
cite U.C.A. §59-11-7 (1953) and K.C.C. vs Salt Lake 
County, 575 P. 2d 705 (1977) as authority for their 
position. 
The Respondents reliance upon U.C.A §59-11-7 
(1953) is misplaced; that section provides as follows: 
No assessment or act relating to assessment 
or collection of taxes is illegal on account 
of informality or because the same was not 
completed within the time required by law. 
The Appellants are not seeking a declaration that any 
Respondent did anything illegal or that the 1978 or 1979 
property taxes or the assessment thereof is illegal. The 
Appellants are seeking a determination that certain 
specific statutory penalties be invoked for failure to 
comply with specific statutory deadlines. The specific 
penalty provisions of §59-5-30 and §59-5-33 (1953) must 
supercede the general disclaimer of U.C.A §59-11-7 (1953). 
The Court must interpret statutes in such a way as to 
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give them meaning rather than to create nonsense of them 
as the Respondents suggest. U.C.A. §§59-5-30 and 59-5-33 
(1953) would be meaningless and of no sense, if U.C.A. 
§59-11-7 (1953) was interpreted as Respondents suggest. 
Furthermore, U.C.A. §59-11-7 (1953) has been 
construed and a determination made that the failure of 
an auditor to prepare and sign an affidavit of compliance 
as required by U.C.A. §59-8-7 (1953) is a fatal defect 
and is not a mere "informality" of the nature contemplated 
in §59-11-7 (1953). Telonis vs. Staley, 104 U. 537, 144 
P. 2d 513; Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Company vs. 
Schoewe, 105 U. 569, 144 P.2d 526; Petterson vs. Ogden 
City, 111 U. 125, 176 P. 2d 599. 
In the case at bar, the Respondent assessors 
did not submit their required affidavits (U.C.A. §59-5-30, 
1953) in timely fashions; they could not do so because 
of their failure to act within statutory limits. Clearly 
those delays are not of the type and nature contemplated 
by U.C.A. §59-11-7 (1953) but were fatally defective 
errors beyond the protection of that section. 
The case of K.C.C. vs. Salt Lake County, 575 
P. 2d 705 (1977) is relied upon by the Respondents in 
their assertion that substantial compliance of statutory 
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deadlines for tax assessment is sufficient. That case 
involved a statute setting a deadline for a county 
commission to perform its statutory duty in levying 
a property tax. The statutes involved were U.C.A. 
§§59-9-6.3 and 17-36-31 (1953); both of these statutes 
provide deadlines; however, there are no penalties set 
forth for the failure of the county officials to comply. 
Both statutes used the word "shall" in setting the 
deadlines, which has been construed to mean the same as 
"must" which is used in the statutes requiring the 
Respondents Cockayne and Yorgason to act in the case at bar. 
K.C.C. vs. Salt Lake County stands for the 
proposition that a statutory requirement (either must, will 
or shall), such as the deadline for Respondent Assessors 
will be considered directory rather than mandatory if: 
1. The purpose of the statute has been 
substantially complied with; and 
2. No substantial rights have been 
jeopardized; and 
3. There are no negative words or limits 
within the statutory scheme regarding 
non-compliance; and 
4. The statute was merely a guide for the 
conduct of business in an orderly 
fashion; and 
5. The purpose of the statute was not to 
protect the taxpayer. 
The crucial points in the case at bar are 
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(1) the existence of two penalty provisions against the 
Respondents, who were the Salt Lake County Assessors, 
and (2) whether a delay of duration involved here under 
the statutory scheme may be said to be "substantial 
compliance". 
Why would the Utah State Legislature enact 
the penalty provisions of U.C.A. §§59-5-30 and 59-5-33 
(1953) unless they wanted the County Assessor to act on 
time or pay a penalty. The doctrine of "substantial 
compliance" may apply where there is no statutory 
penalty, but it cannot apply to negate specific 
legislatively enacted "punishments". 
Another reason why the case of K.C.C. vs. 
Salt Lake County is not applicable to the case at bar 
is the nature of the relief sought. In that case, 
Kennecott Copper Corporation was challenging the 
validity of a tax and seeking a refund of taxes paid. 
The Appellants in this case, Donald and Jane Stromquist, 
are only seeking a declaratory judgment that the statutory 
timetables were not met and that the Respondents are 
subject to specific statutory penalties; they are not 
seeking a refund or a ruling as to the validity of the 
tax or its assessment. 
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The only two viable defenses that the 
Respondents have asserted are (1) substantial 
compliance and (2) the State Tax Commission's delay 
in 1978. Neither of those defenses can stand in light 
of the penalties specifically enacted and directed 
against the Respondent Assessors. An attempt to 
assert the substantial compliance defense or excuse 
the delay because of the State Tax Commission's action 
is an attempt to erase from the law the specific 
penalties enacted (with good reason) by the Utah State 
Legislature. 
The State Tax Commission does not have the 
power to excuse non-conformance with the statutory 
requirement and waive the deadline imposed by law. The 
fact that the State Tax Commission was late in 1978 
(assuming that only for the sake of argument) in their 
re-appraisal, is not an excuse recognizable by statute 
or by this Court for non-compliance. 
In the Answers to Interrogatories by the 
Respondent Milton Yorgason the real reason for the delays 
comes out; "it was physically impossible" to meet the 
deadline, and no Assessor in Salt Lake County has met the 
deadline for seven y~ars. (T.R.II p. 31) The attempt to 
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blame the delay on the Tax Commission for the year 1978 
is a sham. The truth is that the Assessor's Office 
has routinely and annually ignored the law. When 
challenged the Assessor came up with two excuses: (1) 
blame the State Tax Commission and (2) "we've 
substantially complied". Neither excuse is valid nor 
sufficient in light of the· specific statutory penalties 
to be extracted. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no statutory provision allowing the 
Respondent Assessors to avoid the statutory deadline to 
complete their assessment book on or before the first 
Monday in May of each year. The State Tax Commission 
does not have the authority to repeal the deadline or 
waive compliance, and even if they did have that authority, 
they did not grant an extension or waive compliance for 
either 1978 or 1979. 
Substantial compliance is not sufficient when 
a statutory deadline is provided and a specific penalty 
for non-compliance is set forth. 
The Summary Judgments granted the Respondents 
below should be reversed and the matters should be 
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remanded to the Court below with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of the Appellants declaring that: 
1) the statutory deadlines of U.C.A. §59-5-30 
(1953) imposed upon the Respondent Assessors 
were not met in the year 1978 and 1979; 
2) there was no recognizable excuse for the 
Respondent Assessors non-compliance with the 
statutory deadline of U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953); 
3) the Respondent Assessors are subject to 
the penalty provisions of U.C.A. §59-5-30 and 
§59-5-33 (1953); 
4) the Respondent Assessors were wrongfully 
paid their wages and salaries for the period 
of their non-compliance with U.C.A. §59-5-30 
(1953): 
5) the respondent County Commissioners should 
be ordered to institute proceedings against the 
official bonds of the Respondent Assessors for 
forfeiture pursuant to the terms of U.C.A 
§59-5-33 (1953); and 
6) the Respondent County Commissioners should 
be ordered to institute proceedings against the 
Respondent Assessors to recover the wages and 
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salary wrongfully paid to these Assessors 
for the period of their non-compliance 
with U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953). 
DATED this 21st day of April, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of 
the foregoing Consolidated Brief of Appellants to William 
Thomas Peters, Special Deputy County Attorney, Counsel 
for the Defendants-Respondents, 220 South Second East, 
Salt Lake Cit~, Utah 84111, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service on the date written above. 
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